Tag Archives: racial quotas

Diversity Oaths: Another Step Away from Honest Scholarship

When I was nearing the end of my Ph.D. studies in politics at Princeton University in 2006, I was invited to interview for a job at the University of California at Santa Cruz. Midway through the interview process, I was asked by graduate students how I would change my curricula to “accommodate the needs of people of color.” My response, as best I can remember, was, “I would never do such a thing. It undermines the universalism of education and knowledge, demeans people of color with assumptions about their inability to master cutting-edge research, and permanently consigns them to second-rate status in society.” That answer did not go down well at the department hiring meeting, junior faculty there later told me.

The view was that my “incorrect” response to the question indicated that my presence would upset the solidly left-leaning harmony of the department: “I grew up in a dysfunctional family, and I will not work in a dysfunctional department!” the very left-wing senior department member declared. The job went to another candidate who, as best I can tell, failed to make tenure.

Related: Paycheck Unfairness under Cover of Diversity

The experience of failing an ideological litmus test at UC Santa Cruz dwells with me still. Last month the Oregon chapter of the National Association of Scholars, of which I am president, issued a report on the subject: “The Imposition of Diversity Statements on Faculty Hiring and Promotion at Oregon Universities.” It looks at how four Oregon universities are slowly imposing declarations of support for the ideology of “diversity, equity, and inclusion” onto faculty hiring and promotion decisions.

It argues that this implicit ideological litmus test is both a betrayal of public funding for universities and an abandonment of the idea that scholars should be protected from ideological impositions from any part of the political spectrum. The report documents how universities are engaged in what we might call “diversity-baiting”: accusing, denouncing, attacking and persecuting current or potential faculty based on their lack of support for the “diversity, equity, and inclusion” dogma.

Statements at all four universities show that campus diversicrats believe fervently that this ideology must be enforced through university-level sanctions as well as department-level choices. I was discouraged to read my own university’s “Chief Diversity Officer” declare to one news site: “I’m one of those that deeply believes that compliance work is an important engine of the bigger diversity bus, because if you can’t change their hearts and their minds, you will govern their behavior and hold them accountable.” The “diversity bus” is an apt term: reeling down the road, crushing all beneath its tires, and hurling dissenters into the ditch.

To be sure, an acceptance of American pluralism is a core American value. But, as the report shows, “diversity, equity, and inclusion” are always defined on campus in rigidly left-wing terms: an emphasis on group (not individual or national) identities; a focus on group victimization (not on cultural norms or individual behavior); and an insistence on group entitlements (not individual responsibility or equality). It is also no surprise that much of the epicenter of this movement is California.

The report quotes Dr. Tanya Golash-Boza, an associate professor of sociology at the University of California at Merced and during 2016-17 the Vice Chair of the UC System-wide Committee on Affirmative Action, Diversity, & Equity, advising job candidates that their diversity statements should focus on “commonly accepted understandings of diversity and equity” such as “racial oppression, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, ableism or some other commonly recognized form of oppression.” She then suggests that candidates who do not agree with this approach should not bother to apply for jobs: “Note that if you do not care about diversity and equity and do not want to be in a department that does, don’t waste your time crafting a strong diversity statement — and you need not read any further in this essay.”

Related: How a University Moved from Diversity to Indoctrination

Two responses are typically given to criticisms of the diversity statements. One is that “our faculty support this.” But this begs the question of whether issues like this should be decided by majority rule. Even if university faculties were remotely balanced politically, I doubt those majority decisions on ideological conditions on employment would ever be appropriate.

But given the extreme imbalance of political viewpoints – roughly 15 Democrats for every one Republican or moderate on most campuses – the argument for majority rule is laughable. The argument for academic freedom, like the argument for religious freedom, is simply to protect minorities from the theocratic rule of the majority.

A second response is this: faculty can respond to the diversity statement in any way they please, including by not responding at all. But as my experience at the University California at Santa Cruz demonstrates, and as several documents cited in our report show, this is disingenuous. Left-leaning senior mullahs will easily detect deviant behavior from current or prospective faculty and once the fatwah is issued, junior faculty waiting for tenure and promotion will quietly fall into line.

Why does all of this matter? Because at the heart of the crisis in higher education is a slow departure from the university as a pluralistic site of research and teaching excellence. Everything else – growing bureaucracies, rising tuition, union Bolshevism, falling state fiscal support, and declining learning outcomes – revolves around this. Diversity statements are the final, fatal blow that will institutionalize ideological discrimination and render the already-tenuous status of many departments and faculty members as “scholars” permanently on the side of political activism and ideological agitation. No one is safe from the diversity bus. It needs to be driven to the junkyard.

Racial Preferences–Time to End Them?

A New book by Peter H. Schuck, One Nation Undecided: Clear Thinking about Five Hard Issues That Divide Us, focuses on five issues: poverty, immigration, campaign finances, affirmative action, and religious objections to gay marriage and the transgender movement. This excerpt deals with affirmative action.


Institutions argue that a “critical mass” of favored minorities assembled through preferences is crucial to achieving educational diversity, and the Supreme Court has accepted this notion. But what does it mean? It must be a function of either the number or proportion of students needed to produce it, yet the Court, as explained below, has flatly barred any numerical or proportional quotas; even Fisher II demands individualized assessments.

Moreover, the critical-mass criterion is only intelligible if one specifies the level of university activity at which racial assignments are permissible to achieve the critical mass. Is the level campus- wide? academic program–wide? each major, or only some? seminars? lectures? dormitories? sports teams? Neither the schools nor the Court says which it is. Finally, what constitutes a critical mass depends on the individual school, yet the Court in Fisher I emphatically refused to defer to schools’ judgment in this matter.

Related: Dismissing the Reality of Affirmative Action

Stereotypes. In Grutter, the Court majority saw a very close link between critical mass and stereotype destruction: “[W]hen a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students learn that there is no ‘minority viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority students.”

But just the reverse is much more likely. A school cannot prefer students on the basis of skin color or surnames without at the same time endorsing the notions of ethno-racial essentialism and viewpoint determinism. By admitting minority students with academic records that are much weaker (whatever the school’s metric) than those of their competitors, the school can only reinforce the stereotype of academic inferiority. The faculty and non-preferred students notice what is going on and draw the logical and stigmatizing inference that the preferred innuendo about the deserts of almost all but the most unquestionably superior performers in the preferred group—and, as the “lemon” phenomenon suggests, perhaps even of them.

This innuendo tends to perpetuate the very stereotypes that affirmative action is supposed to dispel. A group qua group (which is how preferences treat it) can confer diversity value only if it possesses certain desired qualities—and it can only do that if those qualities inhere in all of its members. (If it doesn’t, then the program should redefine the group to exclude those who lack those qualities, but affirmative action programs do not do this.) But to affirm that a quality inheres in a racial group is to “essentialize” race, utterly contradicting liberal, egalitarian, scientific, and religious values.

These values hold that all individuals are unique and formally equal regardless of genetic heritage and that their race per se causally determines little or nothing about their character, intelligence, experience, or anything else that is relevant to their diversity value. Indeed, if an employer used racial stereotypes in this way, it would clearly violate the law—whether or not the stereotypes were generally true

Related: Is Affirmative Action Micro-Aggressive?

The Size of the “Plus Factor.” The Court majority in Grutter held that “each applicant must be evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.” This, the Court reasoned, will place members of all groups on the same admissions track, where they will compete “on the same footing.” Race and ethnicity can be a “modest plus factor” in a system of “individualized assessments,” but this must not constitute either a “rigid quota” or “racial balancing.”

Fisher II reaffirmed this. But are the ethno-racial plus factors merely “modest”? In fact, they are huge. In the program at issue in Grutter, as the dissenters showed statistically, the plus factor was weighted so heavily that it effectively created a two- track system, tantamount to racial balancing to reach its racially defined “critical mass.” And what was true in Grutter is essentially true of most if not all other affirmative action programs. In 2003, I reviewed the empirical studies on the size of preferences, which showed that the programs gave enormous weight to ethno-racial status—much larger, for example, than the preferences given to legacies and athletes.

This situation is unchanged, judging by more recent analyses of admissions patterns. For example, a study of all students admitted to the nation’s medical schools in 2014–15 found that blacks and Hispanics were vastly more likely to be admitted than whites and Asians with comparable MCAT scores and GPAs. And this was true in every credential range: average, below average, or above average. Writing in 2009, researchers Thomas Espenshade and Alexandra Radford reported that the admission “bonus” for being black was equivalent to 310 SAT points relative to whites and even more relative to Asians. The GPA differences are even greater than for SAT scores. An earlier analysis by another researcher, Thomas Kane, found that black applicants to selective schools “enjoy an advantage equivalent to an increase of two- thirds of a point in [GPA]—on a four-point scale—or the equivalent of] 400 points on the SAT.”

That enormous preferences-conferred advantage seems to have grown even larger since then. In a review article commissioned by the prestigious Journal of Economic Literature and published in March 2016, Peter Arcidiacono and Michael Lovenheim found virtually no overlap between white and black admits’ credentials, especially but not only at law schools: The median black admit had an academic index at the second percentile of the white distribution, and the seventy- fifth percentile of the black admit distribution was at the eighth percentile of the white distribution.

Related: Will the Supreme Court Stop Racial Preferences?

The difference between the black and white admit distributions is not all due to affirmative action: if the African American academic index distribution is below the white distribution, this would produce a difference in the incoming qualifications of black versus white students even in the absence of affirmative action. However, the fact that these distributions are almost non-overlapping is suggestive of a large amount of race- based preferences in admissions being given to African American students. . .

The data also reveal that affirmative action works differently for blacks and Hispanics. While affirmative action is very much present for Hispanics (the median Hispanic admit at Michigan is at the 9th percentile of the white admit distribution), the median Hispanic admit is at the 78th percentile of the black admit distribution. Hispanic admission rates were also lower than those for blacks, despite having on average better test scores and undergraduate grades.

Moreover, the SAT test, which has long been criticized as culturally biased against blacks, is actually an overly optimistic predictor of how they will perform in college. Once on campus, they do worse than the SAT would predict. Finally, 2015 data on SAT scores, broken down by ethnicity, show that the scores of whites and minorities have declined significantly since 2006, while Asians’ scores have risen in all three skills categories, not just math. (The National Assessment of Education Progress [NAEP] scores, while less discouraging, are nothing to celebrate either.)

This suggests, ominously, that those who administer preferences will have to increase their size even more in the future in order to admit low- scoring minorities. These findings raise a crucial question: Are the students who receive these enormous preferences to be admitted to elite schools likely on average to be in over their heads academically? This phenomenon, known as “mismatch,” is discussed below.

Race-Neutral Alternatives. The Court majority has repeatedly insisted that ethno-racial preferences may not be used if workable race- neutral alternatives exist. In an earlier opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court also refused to endorse race-based assignments to public schools where race-neutral assignment methods are available to accomplish the same end. In Fisher II, Justice Kennedy reaffirmed this principle, while concluding that no such alternative existed there. Race-neutral criteria are no panacea, of course, especially when the question is not the one that the Court asks (i.e., whether the Constitution requires it) but instead is about which criteria make the most policy sense if the goal is increasing opportunity for the disadvantaged—which Americans overwhelmingly support.

Given this goal, the most straightforward criterion is to determine disadvantage directly rather than use ethnicity or race as an extremely crude proxy for disadvantage. This approach is more difficult than it sounds for conceptual, administrative, and target efficiency reasons—and it might not yield the ethnic mix that those favoring race-based affirmative action want; indeed, one analysis finds that it would increase the share of whites and Asians on campus and reduce blacks by almost 50 percent! Conceptually, we generally equate disadvantage with economic deprivation, usually measured by income or assets—but disadvantage can be social, not just economic; they are not always congruent and social disadvantage is harder to define and measure.

Related: 25 Years on the Affirmative Action Firing Line

Administratively, determining economic need directly for a very large number of applicants would be at least as challenging as it has been in the operation of need- based social welfare programs. And the difficulty of targeting the neediest is captured by questions posed by Michael Kinsley (a supporter of affirmative action): “Is it worse to be a cleaning lady’s son or a coal miner’s daughter? Two points if your father didn’t go to college, minus one if he finished high school, plus three if you have no father? (or will that reward illegitimacy which we’re all trying hard these days not to do?

Determining who is truly needy is difficult, surely, but not impossible. Richard Sander, a law professor at the University of California at Los Angeles, reports that he actually devised and implemented a sophisticated system of preferences for UCLA law school based on economic need and that the system worked “exceedingly well. Audits of financial aid statements showed little abuse; the preferences substantially changed the social makeup of the class and never to our knowledge, prompted complaints of unfairness.”

Such approaches need to be tried and assessed more broadly, of course, but they may offer one kind of race- neutral alternative to ethno-racial preferences. A second kind of race-neutral alternative is a program that automatically admits students in the upper echelons (say, the top 5 or 10 percent) of their high school classes. Texas, Florida, and California have adopted such percentage programs (although Texas, unsatisfied with the number of minorities its percentage plan yielded, added to it the race- based program challenged in the Fisher litigation).

Percentage programs do seem to increase racial diversity on college campuses, but two realities about such programs should be kept in mind. As Justice Kennedy noted in Fisher II (quoting Justice Ginsburg’s point in Fisher I), these programs, far from being race- neutral, are designed and adopted with race very much in mind. And, given differences among the high schools in different communities, such programs inevitably bring to these campuses many students whose academic preparation is relatively poor.

A third alternative, which has attracted much interest, would not only increase the number of minority students attending selective institutions but also ameliorate a different, more tractable, and even more socially wasteful kind of problem—the substantial pool of high school students who are perfectly capable of performing well at selective colleges but do not even apply to them—or indeed to any college at all! Caroline Hoxby and her colleagues have shown that applications by these students, many of whom are minorities, can be increased through better information about how to apply, about available financial aid opportunities, and about other assistance available on campus. Moreover, increasing applications from this group can be accomplished at trivial cost—as little as $6 per student. Finally, as Justice Alito tartly observed in his dissent in Fisher II, “The most obvious race-neutral alternative” is “race-blind,

Caroline Hoxby and her colleagues have shown that applications by these students, many of whom are minorities, can be increased through better information about how to apply, about available financial aid opportunities, and about other assistance available on campus. Moreover, increasing applications from this group can be accomplished at trivial cost—as little as $6 per student. Finally, as Justice Alito tartly observed in his dissent in Fisher II, “The most obvious race-neutral alternative” is “race-blind, holistic review that considers the applicant’s unique characteristics and personal circumstances.

Related: Are Racial Preferences Now Entrenched for Decades?

The Duration of Preferences. Writing for the Grutter majority, Justice O’Connor expressed hope that “25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary.” Much has been made of her expectation. In his dissent, Justice Thomas recited the grim statistics on comparative academic performance, evidence that makes Justice O’Connor’s hope seem very unrealistic. And the studies of ethno-racial preferences in other societies provide no support for it either, as the economist Thomas Sowell has shown in his cross- national studies.

To the contrary, the studies show that such preferences, once established, tend to endure and perhaps even expand to new groups and new programmatic benefits. The Court’s blessing of affirmative action in Fisher II seems more likely to perpetuate it than to herald their eventual demise. It is true that six politically diverse states (Arizona, California, Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Washington) have banned these preferences by voter referenda, while New Hampshire has done so through statute and Florida through executive order.

But California’s experience after its voters banned the preferences suggests that such bans do not end them but simply drive the preferences underground. The California system engaged in a series of stratagems in the early 2000s expressly designed to circumvent the state’s ban. Some of the more egregious ones involved channeling minority students to new “critical race studies” programs with lower admissions standards; awarding special admissions credit for foreign language fluency to minority students who were already native speakers of the language; adopting “percentage” plans; and using unspecified (and unspecifiable) “holistic” criteria as well as winks and nods by admissions officials.

The evidence suggests that affirmative action advocates will never abandon it but will always find new ways to preserve it. And their arguments will always have a surface plausibility so long as full equality eludes us, which in the real world it surely will—however we define it.

The Role Model Rationale. Affirmative action advocates commonly argue that it is effective in producing a cadre of black professionals who can form a nucleus of group leaders and serve as role models for other group members, especially the young who need to have high aspirations and confidence that others have succeeded despite their common legacy of group disadvantage. This rationale, which has its skeptics even among ardent liberals, applies most strongly in the domain of higher education, which of course is an important training ground for future leaders of society.

Studies on how well such programs perform this function have been chewed over by proponents and opponents of affirmative action alike. There is something to the role model argument. Group members who have succeeded are surely a source of encouragement to young people thinking about their futures. If this is true, however, it is true not just for the groups preferred by affirmative action but for all low- status groups, not just the preferred ones.

This argument, moreover, cannot be separated from questions about the other social signals that youngsters receive from role- modeling. A role model might signal: “If you study hard and work hard and keep your nose clean as I did, you too can succeed.” But in a society in which preferences have become both pervasive and normative, another signal might be: “You get points for having a certain skin color or surname, so you should emphasize that identity and learn to play the ethno-racial card.” How do youngsters in such a society read role-model signals, and how do they integrate conflicting ones? These are important questions to which we have not really sought, and as a methodological matter may not be able to obtain, reliable answers.

The Representation in Elite Institutions Rationale. Like the other rationales, this one has some force. Most Americans want to see disadvantaged minorities better represented in major firms, select universities, high public office, nonprofit organizations, and so forth—if these minorities earn this recognition by meeting the institutions’ legitimate standards, whatever they might be. Affirmative action proponents believe that admitting minorities to these prestigious and advantageous precincts will level the playing field, reducing inequality by providing the advantages that these institutions can confer, including greater satisfaction and future advancement.

To what extent are these hopes actually borne out? The answer has a lot to do with the size of the preferences. In elite institutions, as we have seen, they are very large indeed—so large that they may do more harm than good to many of the putative beneficiaries. An important body of empirical research suggests that this unhappy outcome is occurring, at least in higher education, as a result of a mismatch between the institution’s demands and the preferred students’ academic performance. It indicates that although some affirmative action beneficiaries will surely succeed at the select institutions to which preferences gain them admission, on average they will perform relatively poorly, yet they would probably have succeeded at less select institutions.

In their book-length analysis of this problem, Mismatch: How Affirmative Action Hurts the Students It’s Intended to Help and Why Universities Won’t Admit it, Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor, Jr., conclude that mismatching largely explains “why, even though blacks are more likely to enter college than are whites with similar backgrounds, they will usually get much lower grades, rank toward the bottom of the class, and far more often drop out.

Senators Reward OCR Abuses with Budget Hike Proposal

Twenty-two Senators have asked the Appropriations Committee to increase the budget of the Education Department’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) by almost 30%. All of those Senators are Democrats except for Sen. Dean Heller of Nevada.

OCR has pressured colleges and high schools to adopt unconstitutional speech codes. It also has pressured school districts to adopt veiled racial quotas in school discipline. And in sexual harassment cases, it has stacked the deck against accused students, and occasionally forced colleges to reward false allegations. It has done all these things by expanding and essentially rewriting the federal civil-rights laws Title VI and Title IX through uncodified administrative “guidance” and “Dear Colleague” letters.

The pretext for this proposed increase is that OCR is supposedly overworked. But if this is actually true (which is doubtful, as I explained in the Chronicle of Higher Education; delays at OCR often occur due to its own slowness, inefficiency, and mismanagement), it is only because of OCR’s own overreaching. It routinely makes up violations out of thin air in a way that generates far more “violations” to investigate.

The “Dear Colleague” letter lowered the burden of proof in campus cases of sexual misconduct from ”clear and convincing evidence” to “preponderance of the evidence,” in effect just over 50 % certainty of guilt. It also helped erode other due process protections.

As The Washington Examiner notes, Several Democratic senators are requesting additional funds for the Education Department to continue policing the sex lives of college students.

Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand, Tim Kaine, Claire McCaskill and Mark Warner have written a letter calling for increased funding for the Department’s Office for Civil Rights. . .The senators are requesting a budget of $137.7 million for OCR. [The current level is $107 million].

Here’s how we got to this point, put as simply as possible: In 2011, OCR sent out a “Dear Colleague” letter that vastly expanded the definition of Title IX and what schools needed to do in order to comply with the statute. Because of the broadening of the statute, schools have been accused of violating students’ rights under Title IX and have come under investigation by OCR. Now OCR is requesting more money to investigate these schools because it has become overwhelmed.

The “Dear Colleague” letter sent by OCR in 2011 did not go through the required notice-and-comment period…. This prompted Sen. James Lankford, R-Okla., to demand that OCR justify its overreach. OCR failed to do so to Lankford’s liking.

Why does this matter? OCR expanded its own responsibilities — it wasn’t Congress or anyone else who gave it more authority. Put another way: OCR expanded its own responsibilities and now wants more money to carry out those responsibilities.

Sherry Warner, president of Families Advocating for Campus Equality, criticized the proposed increase sought by the Senators in their March 17 letter. “The request by Senators McCaskill and Gillibrand of $137.7 million for the Office for Civil Rights at the Department of Education essentially rewards the OCR for its current overreach on college campuses,” Warner wrote. “This request asks the Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services & Education to fund the OCR’s illegal, expansive and nebulous standards which schools around the country are struggling to enforce.”

Legal experts have also questioned the wisdom of increasing OCR’s budget. In a February 26, 2015, letter to Congress, two members of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights noted that OCR “has all too often been willing to define perfectly legal conduct as unlawful. Though OCR may claim to be underfunded, its resources are stretched thin largely because it has so often chosen to address violations it has made up out of thin air. Increasing OCR’s budget would in effect reward the agency for frequently overstepping the law.”

Congress already increased OCR’s budget by 7% last year in the omnibus spending bill passed in December with President Obama’s assent. That drew criticism from Investor’s Business Daily, which lamented that the “omnibus spending bill grants a generous 7% increase in the budget for the Education Department’s Office for Civil Rights, which is pressuring school districts across the country to adopt racial quotas in discipline,” in what the newspaper characterized as “radical, out-of-control, race-mongering.”

It also is not clear that increases in OCR’s caseload in recent years actually reflect additional work. On March 18, 2015, The Washington Post quoted OCR’s head admitting that just “two individuals were responsible for filing more than 1,700 of those allegations.” Former Congressman John Linder has noted that OCR is extremely inefficient in handling its cases.

If OCR were not stretching and rewriting the law, it would probably have fewer complaints to process than in years past, and could make do with a smaller budget than it now has, as I explained earlier. Its budget should be cut, not increased.